Philip M. Fearnside
dam licensing
The history of dam construction in the Amazon is full of examples of problems that prevented the licensing process from fulfilling its purpose, regardless of whether the problems constitute a violation of the law. Environmental Impact Studies (EIAs) in Brazil are always highly favorable to proposed projects, minimizing their impacts and exaggerating their benefits. This stems in part from a system where the proponent pays for the study, comments on the report and suggests changes before it is submitted to the authorities. The last installment of the payment is normally made only if the report is favorably received by the government agency. The reporting industry, both at the consulting firm level and at the individual consultant level, has strong motivation to produce project-friendly documents to increase the chances of being hired for future projects. Examples include the Tucuruí, Samuel, Santo Antônio/Jirau, Belo Monte, Jatapu and Cotingo dams. [1-9].
Standards
A number of standards have been developed to guide decisions about projects such as hydropower, and these address many of the issues discussed in the previous sections. However, the application of these rules was disappointing. More important than the formulation of yet another list of rules is the need to apply existing rules.
A set of specific rules for dams has been developed by the World Commission on Dams (WCD). This 404 page document [10] was initially well received by the World Bank [11]but in practice the Bank has marginalized these standards in its dam financing [12]. The same is true for national governments, as evidenced by the construction of dams in the Amazon, discussed in the previous sections.
A general set of rules for all development projects are the Equator Principles (http://www.equator-principles.com/ ). Financial institutions can adhere to this set of voluntary guidelines. The violation of the Equator Principles was a factor in the refusal of Banco do Brasil and Banco Itaú to contribute to the financing of the Belo Monte dam [13]but these principles did not prevent Banco Santander, from Spain, from becoming the main intermediary for BNDES financing of the Santo Antônio dam, on the Madeira River [14].
Particularly important is the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), which lent a total of US$96.3 billion, or three times the World Bank’s global total lending. [15] in 2010. International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), were accused of channeling funds through BNDES as a means of avoiding the need to comply with these institutions’ environmental policies, a loan to BNDES in US$2 billion from the World Bank being pointed out as an example of this practice [16]. BNDES did not approve the Equator Principles, but it has a set of internal guidelines on social and environmental responsibility [17] and a socio-environmental policy approved in 2010 (see: [15], for. 12). However, the transparency criteria still need to be met. [18] (Franck, 2012). One of the BNDES’ environmental principles is: “The Bank is also guided by internationally recognized good practices, such as those established by the World Commission on Dams (WCD)” [17]. The 80% of Belo Monte’s costs financed by BNDES demonstrate that this principle has no detectable effect in practice.
Resettlement is one of the main impacts of dams. The World Bank has a set of rules for resettlement [19]largely due to the Bank’s role in the past as creating disastrous social impacts from financing dams such as the Narmada dams in India [20]. A comprehensive set of resettlement guidelines has been developed by Cernea [21] based on the experiences of the World Bank (See also: [22]). The World Bank financed few dams for about ten years, starting in the early 1990s, largely due to concerns about social impacts, but since then this precaution has eased and funding for dams has increased again. [23].
References
[1] Fearnside, PM 1999. Social impacts of Brazil’s Tucuruí Dam. Environmental Management 24(4): 483-495. doi: 10.1007/s002679900248
[2] Fearnside, PM 2001. Environmental impacts of Brazil’s Tucuruí Dam: Unlearned lessons for hydroelectric development in Amazonia. Environmental Management 27(3): 377-396. doi: 10.1007/s002670010156
[3] Fearnside, PM 2005. Brazil’s Samuel Dam: Lessons for hydroelectric development policy and the environment in Amazonia. Environmental Management 35(1): 1-19. doi: 10.1007/s00267-004-0100-3
[4] Fearnside, PM 2006. Dams in the Amazon: Belo Monte and Brazil’s Hydroelectric Development of the Xingu River Basin. Environmental Management 38(1): 16-27. doi: 10.1007/s00267-005-00113-6
[5] Fearnside, PM 2006. Consultants’ opinions on the Environmental Impact Study of the Santo Antônio and Jirau hydroelectric project, Rio Madeira-RO. Technical Opinion on ecosystems. Part B, Volume 1, Opinion 8, p. 1-15 In: Technical Opinions from Sector Specialists—Physical/Biotic Aspects. Content Analysis Report of the Environmental Impact Studies (EIA) and the Environmental Impact Report (RIMA) of the Santo Antônio and Jirau Hydroelectric Power Plants on the Madeira River, State of Rondônia. Public Ministry of the State of Rondônia, Porto Velho, RO. 2 Vol.
[6] Fearnside, PM 2011. Greenhouse Gases in the EIA-RIMA of the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant. New NAEA Notebooks 14(1): 5-19.
[7] Fearnside, PM & RI Barbosa. 1996. Political benefits as barriers to assessment of environmental costs in Brazil’s Amazonian development planning: The example of the Jatapu Dam in Roraima. Environmental Management 20(5): 615-630. doi: 10.1007/BF01204135
[8] Fearnside, PM & RI Barbosa. 1996. The Cotingo Dam as a test of Brazil’s system for evaluating proposed developments in Amazonia. Environmental Management 20(5): 631-648. doi: 10.1007/BF01204136
[9] Magalhães, SMSB & FM Hernandez (eds.). 2009 Expert Panel: Critical Analysis of the Environmental Impact Study of the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Project . Expert Panel on the Belo Monte Dam, Belém, PA. 230 p. Available in:
[10] WC 2000 Dams and Development – A New Framework for Decision Making – The Report of the World Commission on Dams. World Commission on Dams (WCD) & Earthscan, London, UK. 404 p. Available in:
[11] World Bank. 2001. Report of the World Commission on Dams: World Bank position. The World Bank Fact Sheet . The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA 2 p.
[12] McCully, P. 2002. The Difficulty of the Plains: Taking the WCD forward.
[13] Schmidt, B. 2012. Esteves Backs $14 Billion Amazon Dam Itau Shuns. Bloomberg, December 04, 2012.
[14] International Rivers, Friends of the Earth Brazilian Amazon, Amazon Watch & Setem. 2009. Spain’s Banco Santander Criticized for Hypocrisy. International Rivers, Berkeley, California, USA
[15] Widmer, R. 2012. The Brazilian Safeguard Regime, Its Application, and Recommendations for the Future. One Advisory, Sao Paulo, SP. 48 p.
[16] International Rivers. 2009. Brazil’s National Destruction Bank Does it Up Big.
[17] BNDES, 2013. Social and Environmental Responsibility.
[18] Franck, A. 2012. Is the EIB’s Climate Change Loan to Brazil Sustainable? Both ENDS Policy Note, 23 p.
[19] World Bank. 2011. OP 4.12 – Involuntary Resettlement. The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA
[20] Morse, B., T. Berger, D. Gamble & H. Brody. 1992. Sardar Sarovar: Report of the Independent Review . Resources Futures International, Ottawa, Canada. 363 p.
[21] Cernea, MM1988. Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects: Policy Guidelines in World Bank-Financed Projects . (World Bank technical paper no. 80), The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA. 88 p. Available in:
[22] Cernea, M. 2000. Impoverishment Risks, Safeguards, and Reconstruction: A Model for Population Displacement and Resettlement. In: M. Cernea & C. McDowell (eds.) Risks and Reconstruction. Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees. The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA 504 p.
[23] This text is a partial translation of a chapter entitled “Análisis de los main hydro-energetic projects in the Amazon region” to be published in C. Gamboa & E. Gudynas (eds.) The Future of the Amazon . General Secretariat of the International Panel on Environment and Energy: Decree, Environment and Natural Resources (DAR), Lima, Peru & Latin American Center for Social Ecology (CLAES), Montevideo, Uruguay. The author’s research is funded by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) (proc. 304020/2010-9; 573810/2008-7), by the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Amazonas (FAPEAM) (proc. 708565). ) and by the National Institute for Research in the Amazon (INPA) (PRJ15.125).
