Dams in the Amazon 19: Belo Monte’s dangerous precedents

CMIO 17 de March de 2014

4 minutes read

PHILIP M. FEARNSIDE

In Belo Monte, the preliminary license was granted a new setback was added on February 1, 2010 (after the change of the head of the licensing sector from IBAMA in November 2009, under intense pressure from the Civil House: [1]). In the preliminary license, IBAMA specified 40 “conditions”, and there were another 26 conditions of the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI). Very little was done to comply with the constraints in the 16 months between the preliminary license and the granting of the installation license on June 1, 2011 (immediately after a change in the president of IBAMA). The licensing was contrary to IBAMA’s technical staff, who a week earlier, on May 23, 2011, delivered a 252-page technical opinion indicating that only 11 of IBAMA’s 40 conditions had been considered [2]. Since “conditions” are requirements that must be met before a license is granted, one may wonder what value the conditions will have for other infrastructure projects that are in the licensing process in Brazil. The Instituto Socioambiental (ISA), a non-governmental organization based in Brasília, is developing a detailed study of the situation of each of the conditions in Belo Monte.

Legal questioning about irregularities in the licensing process, usually done by the Public Ministry, often has only a marginal effect on the overall approval and construction process. This is because a 1992 law allows judges to overturn any injunctions (such as those based on violations of environmental licensing regulations) if stopping a project would cause “serious harm to the public economy” (Law no. 8437 of 30 June 1992). ). The irony of the date of this law can be observed, just two weeks after the end of the ECO-92 “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro. This law has been used repeatedly to justify decisions to ignore objections to dams regardless of the magnitude of impacts and documentation irregularities (e.g., [3]).

In the case of Belo Monte, more important than legal issues are the project’s understated impacts and exaggerations of benefits, as well as a decision-making process that is blind to both. The official scenario, known as the “institutionalized lie” by opponents of the dam [4], is that only one dam would be built on the Xingu River, that is, Belo Monte. However, Belo Monte alone is economically unfeasible because the highly seasonal water flow in the river would leave the main 11,000 MW powerhouse essentially inactive for 3-4 months of the year (see hydrograph at: [5], vol. 1, p. 54). In four months of the year the minimum flow is lower than the swallow of 695 m³/s of a single main powerhouse turbine ([6], Volume II, p. 11-3), even without deducting the flow that would have to pass through the Volta Grande of the Xingu River.

An economic analysis estimates that there is only a 28% chance of making a profit. [7]. This is based on an official estimate from June 2001, indicating a cost of R$9.6 billion (US$4 billion at the time). Since then, the official budget has been increased to R$19 billion, and construction companies’ estimates are R$30 billion (approximately US$18 billion today). Since no one would invest these amounts with the intention of losing money, this suggests that the government and investors are actually counting on upstream dams flooding vast areas of forest and indigenous lands. [8]. President Dilma Rousseff’s announcement, in her speech on Environment Day on June 5, 2013, that Brazil now needs “reservoir hydroelectric plants” instead of run-of-river plants [9] could be an allusion to Babaquara [10].

References

[1] Brack, P. 2010. Bury my conscience far away from this river. OECO03/02/2010.

[2] Brazil, IBAMA (Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources). 2011. Opinion No. 52/2011AHE Belo Monte-COHID/CGENE/DILIC/IBAMA. ref: Analysis of the request for an Installation License for the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant, process no. 02001.001848/2006-75. IBAMA, Brasilia, DF, Brazil. 252 p. Available in:

[3] Fearnside, PM & RI Barbosa. 1996. Political benefits as barriers to assessment of environmental costs in Brazil’s Amazonian development planning: The example of the Jatapu Dam in Roraima. Environmental Management 20(5): 615-630. doi: 10.1007/BF01204135

[4] Nader, V. 2008. Institutionalized lie justifies Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant. Citizenship Mail, June 17, 2008.

[5] Brazil, ELETROBRÁS (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S/A). 2009 Belo Monte Hydroelectric Development: Environmental Impact Study. February 2009. ELETROBRÁS. Rio de Janeiro – RJ. 36 vol.

[6] Brazil, ELETRONORTE (Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Brasil, SA). 2002. Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex: Feasibility Studies, Final Report. ELETRONORTE), Brasília, DF. 8 vol.

[7] Sousa Júnior, WC & J. Reid. 2010. Uncertainties in Amazon hydropower development: Risk scenarios and environmental issues around the Belo Monte dam. Water Alternatives 3(2): 249-268.

[8] Fearnside, PM 2006. Dams in the Amazon: Belo Monte and Brazil’s Hydroelectric Development of the Xingu River Basin. Environmental Management 38(1): 16-27. doi: 10.1007/s00267-005-00113-6

[9] Borges, A. 2013. Dilma defends hydroelectric plants with large reservoirs. Valor Econômico, June 6, 2013.

[10] This text is a partial translation of a chapter entitled “Análisis de los main hydro-energetic projects in the Amazon region” to be published in C. Gamboa & E. Gudynas (eds.) The Future of the Amazon. General Secretariat of the International Panel on Environment and Energy: Decree, Environment and Natural Resources (DAR), Lima, Peru & Latin American Center for Social Ecology (CLAES), Montevideo, Uruguay. The author’s research is funded by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) (proc. 304020/2010-9; 573810/2008-7), by the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Amazonas (FAPEAM) (proc. 708565). ) and by the National Institute for Research in the Amazon (INPA) (PRJ15.125).

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